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Abstract 
We analyse the effects of managerial overconfidence on financing decisions and firm 
value when investors face managerial moral hazard. We consider two cases. In the 
first case, the manager may have an incentive to exert an inefficiently low level of 
effort in running the business (‘managerial shirking’). The manager may issue high 
debt as a commitment device (the increase in expected financial distress drives him to 
a higher effort level). An overconfident manager overestimates his ability, and 
underestimates financial distress costs. Therefore, our first model predicts a positive 
relationship between overconfidence and debt. However, the effect of overconfidence 
on firm value is ambiguous, and depends which factor (the positive effect of higher 
effort, or the negative effect of higher debt and higher expected financial distress) 
dominates.  In the second case, the manager has an incentive to use free cash flow to 
invest in a new pet project that may be value-reducing (the free cash flow problem). 
In contrast to the first case, overconfidence may result in a decrease in debt (the 
rational manager knows that the new project is value-reducing and uses high debt to 
commit not to invest in it, while the overconfident manager perceives the new project 
as value-increasing, and reduces debt in order to make the investment). Again, the 
effect of overconfidence on firm value is ambiguous, since a project that may have 
been value-reducing under a rational manager may indeed be value-increasing under 
an overconfident manager, as the overconfident manager exerts higher effort. We 
conclude our analysis by conceptualising a model of  “excessive life-cycle debt 
sensitivity due to managerial overconfidence” not previously explored in the 
literature. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), much research effort has 
been directed at understanding firms’ capital structure and investment decisions, and 
the corresponding effects on firm value. Until recently, the standard approach was to 
assume rationality of managers and investors. For example, a large body of research 
exists examining the role of security signalling in the face of informational 
asymmetries in a rational framework (eg Leland and Pyle 1977, Ross 1977, Myers 
and Majluf 1984).  Another strand of research examines the use of capital structure to 
mitigate agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Grossman and Hart 1982,  
Jensen 1986, Dewatripont and Tirole 1991, Fairchild 2003). This approach assumes a 
principal-agent problem based on selfish managerial rationality.  
 
Increasingly, researchers are recognising that managerial biases may affect corporate 
finance decisions. Particularly, research efforts have focused on the effects of 
managerial overconfidence on managers’ financing and investment decisions1. 
In this paper, we focus on the combined effects of managerial overconfidence and 
moral hazard on capital structure decisions (that is, we do not consider asymmetric 
information and signalling problems).  In the next section, we begin by reviewing the 
research into rational capital structure decisions in the face of moral hazard, before 
discussing the research into managerial overconfidence and capital structure in section 
1.2. 
                                                 
1 See, for example,  Statman and Caldwell 1987, Kahnemann and Lovallo 1993, Stein 1996,  Shefrin 
1999, Goel and Thakor 2000,  Malmendier et al 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, Heaton 2002, Gervais et al 2003, 
Hackbarth 2002, 2004a, 2004b, Oliver 2005, Ben-David et al 2006, de C. Barros and Di Micela da 
Silveira 2007, Fairchild 2004, 2005a, 2005b, Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001.  For a comprehensive 
review of the literature in this area, see Baker et al (2004). 
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1.1 Rational Capital Structure Decisions in the face of moral hazard. 
 
The seminal work on rational capital structure decisions in the face of agency 
problems/moral hazard was undertaken by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They 
considered a model in which a self-interested manager could divert company funds 
for consumption of value-reducing private benefits. Increasing the debt level (and 
reducing outside equity) aligned the manager with the investors by increasing the 
manager’s personal equity stake in the firm, hence reducing his incentives to take 
private benefits.  
Jensen (1986) considered self-interested managers’ incentives to waste free cash flow 
on empire-building, value-reducing, projects. Increasing debt commits managers to 
paying out to debt holders, hence reducing the free cash flow problem. 
 Grossman and Hart (1982), Dewatripont and Tirole (1991), and Fairchild (2003) 
recognised the disciplining role of debt. In the Grossman and Hart model, the 
manager can divert cash flows for investment in private benefits, while in the two 
latter models, managers do not like exerting effort, and so have an incentive to 
‘slack’.  If debt holders are not paid, they can force the firm into bankruptcy. This 
provides an incentive for managers to increase effort level, increasing firm value. An 
interesting implication of these models is that managers may voluntarily wish to issue 
high levels of debt in order to commit to higher effort levels and high firm value. This 
is because, in an efficient capital market in which rational investors pay a fair price 
for their investments, existing equity holders, including management, gain all of the 
positive net present value from an investment.  
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1.2 Managerial Overconfidence and Capital Structure Decisions. 
 
Increasingly, researchers are recognising that the bias of overconfidence may play a 
significant role in managers’ financing and investment decisions (see footnote 1). 
Heaton (2002) cites the psychological research (eg, Weinstein 1980, March and 
Shapira 1987) that supports the view that people are over-optimistic or overconfident. 
This research demonstrates that agents tend to be more optimistic about outcomes a) 
that they believe that they can control, and b) to which they are highly committed.  
Both findings support the view that managers may be overconfident about the success 
of their ventures.  
 
In Shefrin’s (1999) survey of behavioral finance, he states that overconfidence may 
induce a manager to adopt an excessively heavy, sub-optimal, debt-laden capital 
structure. Heaton (2002) analysed the effect of overconfidence on financing decisions 
in the absence of asymmetric information or moral hazard problems. Since the 
manager is overconfident, he believes that the market undervalues his equity. 
Therefore, the Myers-Majluf mispricing problem exists. That is, the manager may 
pass up a positive NPV project, in which case, free cashflow is beneficial. However, 
due to managerial overconfidence, the manager may take negative NPV projects that 
he mistakenly believes to be positive NPV. Now free cashflow is harmful (as in 
Jensen 1986). Hence, Heaton argues that, given managerial overconfidence, an 
optimal level of free cashflow exists that eliminates both the Myers-Majluf and Jensen 
problem.   
Hackbarth (2002, 2004a, 2004b) develops models to consider the effects of 
managerial overconfidence on capital structure decisions. Hackbarth (2002) 
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demonstrates that managerial overconfidence results in higher debt levels, which may 
be beneficial for shareholders.  Hackbarth presents two versions of the model. In the 
first version, the manager attempts to act in the interest of shareholders, His objective 
is to maximise the perceived value of the firm (trading-off tax benefits versus 
bankruptcy costs of debt). Since an overconfident manager perceives debt as more 
undervalued than equity, he issues higher level of debt than a rational manager. In the 
second version of Hackbarth’s model, the agency problem of free cashflow exists (as 
in Jensen 1986). An overconfident manager chooses a higher debt level than a rational 
manager. This serves to mitigate the free cashflow problem, hence aligning managers’ 
and shareholders’ objectives.  
Hackbarth (2004a) considers a wider menu of effects of managerial overconfidence. 
He finds that overconfident managers choose higher debt levels, issue new debt more 
often, need not follow a pecking order of financing, and tend to time capital structure 
decisions. Hackbarth (2004b) considers the effect of managerial overconfidence on 
bondholder/shareholder conflicts. He demonstrates that overconfidence can mitigate 
underinvestment problems, but can exacerbate risk-shifting problems. 
Despite the difficulties of finding observable measures of managerial overconfidence, 
there have been some recent attempts at empirical analysis of the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and capital structure. Malmendier and Tate (2005b, 
2005c) proxy managerial overconfidence using managers’ stock option exercise 
decisions. The same authors (2005a, 2005c) analyse press statements to develop an 
index of managerial overconfidence. Oliver (2005) uses the University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index as a measure of overconfidence. Barros and Silveira 
(2007) employ an entrepreneur/non-entrepreneur classification as a proxy for 
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overconfidence. All of these studies find a positive relationship between 
overconfidence and debt. 
In this paper, we develop a financing model in which managerial overconfidence and 
agency problems combine to affect the manager’s debt decision and firm value. We 
consider two cases. In the first case, the manager may have an incentive to exert an 
inefficiently low level of effort in running the business (‘managerial shirking’). The 
manager may issue high debt as a commitment device (the increase in expected 
financial distress drives him to a higher effort level). An overconfident manager 
overestimates his ability, and underestimates financial distress costs. Therefore, our 
first model predicts a positive relationship between overconfidence and debt. 
However, the effect of overconfidence on firm value is ambiguous, and depends 
which factor (the positive effect of higher effort, or the negative effect of higher debt 
and higher expected financial distress) dominates.  In the second case, the manager 
has an incentive to use free cash flow to invest in a new pet project that may be value-
reducing (the free cash flow problem). In contrast to the first case, overconfidence 
may result in a decrease in debt (the rational manager knows that the new project is 
value-reducing and uses high debt to commit not to invest in it, while the 
overconfident manager perceives the new project as value-increasing, and reduces 
debt in order to make the investment). Again, the effect of overconfidence on firm 
value is ambiguous, since a project that may have been value-reducing under a 
rational manager may indeed be value-increasing under an overconfident manager, as 
the overconfident manager exerts higher effort. 
 Hence, our first model supports the existing empirical research that finds a positive 
relationship between managerial overconfidence and debt. However, our second 
model derives a novel result, not previously found in the theoretical or empirical 
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research; managerial overconfidence may result in a decrease in debt, as the 
overconfident manager overestimates future investment opportunities, and hence 
reduces debt, compared to the rational manager, in order to invest in these new 
projects. Later in the paper, we discuss this novel result, and the implications for 
future research. 
 
1.3 Managerial Overconfidence and Life-cycle Financing. 
 
Damodaran (2001) argues that a firm’s capital structure decisions are not static and 
constant, but are dynamic over the life-cycle of the firm. He postulates that the firms’ 
debt level should be low in the early start-up and growth stages, as firms need 
flexibility for new projects, and the disciplining role of debt is low. When the firm 
approaches the later mature growth and decline stages, Damodaran (2001) argues that 
high debt may be optimal. In these latter stages, the firm does not have many good 
investment opportunities available, and so does not need financial flexibility. 
Furthermore, managerial moral hazard (for example, effort shirking) may be high, so 
that the disciplining role of debt becomes important. 
Combining the results of our two models, we suggest a novel result, which we term 
“excessive life-cycle debt sensitivity due to managerial overconfidence.”  Our early-
stage model shows that, when investment opportunities are available (with some 
having positive NPV and some having negative NPV), an overconfident manager may 
choose lower debt than a rational manager. Our later stage model shows that, when 
there are few investment opportunities available, and when the disciplining role of 
debt becomes important, an overconfident manager may choose higher debt than a 
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rational manager.  Hence, life-cycle debt may be sensitive to managerial 
overconfidence. We discuss this further in section 4. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our later stage 
‘managerial shirking’ model, and demonstrate a positive relationship between 
overconfidence and debt.  In section 3, we present our early stage ‘free cashflow’ 
model, and demonstrate a negative relationship between overconfidence and debt.  In 
section 4, we discuss the empirical implications of our model, and conceptualise our 
“excessive life-cycle debt sensitivity due to managerial overconfidence” model. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. A ‘later-stage’ Financing Model of Managerial Overconfidence and 
Shirking. 
 
In our first model, we consider moral hazard relating to managerial shirking, and the 
manager’s use of debt to commit to higher effort. In terms of the life-cycle, our first 
model may be considered as a ‘later stage’ in the life-cycle. The firm does not have 
any future investment opportunities, and debt can be considered as addressing moral 
hazard relating to existing projects and current performance. 
 
We consider a firm, run by a self-interested manager. The manager may be fully 
rational (‘well calibrated’), or he may be overconfident regarding his ability. 
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The timeline of our game is as follows. 
 
Date 0 (Financing stage): The firm makes its debt decision. It may issue one of three 
possible debt levels; },2,0,0{ DDDDDd HML =>==∈  representing low (zero) 
debt, medium debt, or high debt, respectively. Debt is repayable at date 2. 
 In addition, the firm has an existing asset in place DA 2>  at date 0. The asset in 
place grows in value between date 2 and date 3, such that it becomes )1( gA +  at date 
3 if debt-holders are paid at date 2, and )1)(( gdA +−  at date 3 if debt-holders are not 
paid at date 2. The rationale behind this is that if the debt-holders are not paid at date 
2, they seize assets to obtain their payoff. This disrupts the firm’s future growth. This 
may be thought of as financial distress.  
The financial market observes the manager’s debt decision, and values the firm 
accordingly. The manager receives a proportion ]1,0[∈α  of the date 0 market value 
of the firm.  
Date 1 (Effort Stage): The manager chooses an effort level .e  He faces a cost of effort 
.2eβ  
Date 2 (Project Outcome/ Debt Repayment Stage): The project succeeds with 
probability ,ep γ=  and fails with probability .11 ep γ−=−  The manager perceives 
the success probability as ,ˆˆ ep γ=  where γγ ≥ˆ  measures the level of overconfidence. 
If the project succeeds, it provides income DDR H 2=>  and debt-holders are repaid, 
regardless of the level of debt chosen at date 0. If the project fails, it provides income 
zero, and debt holders are not paid. Therefore, they seize assets .dA −  
Date 3: (Asset Growth Stage):  Assets in place grow to )1( gA +  or )1)(( gdA +− , as 
described earlier. 
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The date 1 value of the firm is;   
 
).1)(()]1([ gdAgdRpV +−+++=     (1) 
 
The manager’s perceived payoff is 
 
.)ˆ1(ˆ 2eFdpVM βα −−−=∏      (2) 
 
We solve by backward induction.  
 
Date 2: The manager’s choice of Effort. 
 
We take as given the manager’s date 0 debt choice ,d  and the date 1 market valuation 
,V  and consider the manager’s optimal date 2 effort choice. 
 
Substituting for ep γˆˆ =  into (2), and solving ,0ˆ =∂
∏∂
e
M  we obtain the manager’s 
optimal effort level; 
 
.
2
ˆ
* β
γFde =        (3) 
 
Note that the manager’s optimal effort level is increasing in overconfidence, in 
expected financial distress, and in the debt level. It is decreasing in the cost of effort 
parameter. 
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Substituting (3) into (2), we obtain the manager’s indirect payoff; 
 
 
.
4
ˆˆ
222
β
γα dFFdVM +−=∏      (4) 
 
Note that, since ],1,0[
2
ˆˆˆ
2
∈== β
γγ Fdep  (4) is decreasing in d  for a given Vα . 
However, the manager is using the debt level as a commitment to effort, which affects 
Vα . Therefore, we now move back to date 0 to solve for the optimal debt level. 
 
Date 0: Manager’s choice of debt level. 
 
We now move back to date 0 in order to determine the manager’s optimal debt choice. 
We assume that investors are fully rational, and correctly anticipate the effect of the 
manager’s date 0 choice of debt on his date 2 effort level, as given by equation (3). 
Therefore, the manager’s date 0 choice of debt level determines date 0 market 
valuation .V  The manager knows that the market assesses the success probability as 
ep γ=  (the overconfident manager believes that the market under-assesses his 
ability), which we substitute into equation (2).  Therefore, the manager’s payoff 
becomes; 
 
 
.
4
ˆ
)1)(()]1([
2
ˆˆ
222
β
γ
β
γγ dFFdgdAgdRFdM +−+−+++=∏   (5) 
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The manager’s payoff from the respective debt choices }2,,0{ DDd ∈  is 
 
).1(ˆ gAM +=∏         (6) 
 
.
4
ˆ
)1)(()]1([
2
ˆˆ
222
β
γ
β
γγ DFFDgDAgDRFDM +−+−+++=∏   (7) 
 
.
4
ˆ42)1)(2()]1(2[
2
ˆ2ˆ
222
β
γ
β
γγ DFFDgDAgDRFDM +−+−+++=∏  (8) 
 
We assume that (8) > (7) and (8) > (6) for the overconfident manager, and (7 ) > (8) 
and (7) > (6) for the rational manager, for whom .ˆ γγ =   Therefore, the rational 
manager optimally chooses the medium debt level ,Dd =  and the overconfident 
manager chooses high debt .2Dd =  
Therefore, we state the following; 
Proposition 1: The rational manager’s chooses medium debt level ,Dd =  and the 
overconfident manager chooses high debt .2Dd =  Firm value is positively related to 
debt (and overconfidence) if   
 
>−+−+++ FDgDAgDRFD 2)1)(2()]1(2[
2
ˆ2
β
γγ
.)1)(()]1([
2
2
FDgDAgDRFD −+−+++β
γ    
 
otherwise, firm value is negatively related to debt (and overconfidence). 
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Hence, our first model supports the existing research that finds a positive relationship 
between managerial overconfidence and debt. Intuitively, the overconfident manager 
overestimates his skill, and therefore overestimates the probability of success. 
Therefore, he underestimates the probability of financial distress. This induces him to 
choose high debt level (to commit to high effort in order to increase current market 
valuation, which boosts his compensation).  
Although overconfidence leads to higher debt, and a potentially higher probability of 
financial distress, the effect on firm value is ambiguous, because, as well as inducing 
higher debt, overconfidence also induces higher managerial effort. 
 
 
3. An ‘early stage’ Financing Model of Managerial Overconfidence and Free 
Cash Flow.  
 
In our second model, we consider an early-stage firm that has productive investment 
opportunities (or projects) available, and has sufficient free cash flow to make these 
investments. The firm’s debt level affects its financial flexibility to make these 
investments. Investors are risk-neutral, and the risk-free rate is zero. 
 
We consider the following time-line: 
 
Date 0 (Firm’s Choice of Debt Level): The firm begins with free cash flow .0>X  
The firm chooses a low, medium or high debt level, respectively 
IXDIXIXDIXD HML −>−−∈−< },,2{,2  (with I  to be described next). Debt 
is repayable at date 1.  
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Date 1 (Investment Stage): The firm continues to hold free cash flow .0>X  Further, 
the firm has two new projects (project 1 and project 2) available (the manager and the 
market were aware of these opportunities at date 0). Each project requires investment 
,I  with .2IX >    
If project 1 is taken, it provides a sure cashflow IR >   at date 2, and therefore has 
positive net present value (NPV).  The expected outcome of project 2 is affected by 
managerial effort, as described next. 
Furthermore, we assume that, if the manager can only take one project, he will take 
project 1. Therefore, the debt level affects the firm’s ability to take the projects as 
follows. If  ,2IXDL −<  the firm can take both projects. If  },,2{ IXIXDM −−∈  
the firm can only take project 1. If ,IXDH −>  the firm cannot take any project. 
 
Date 2 (Effort Stage): If the manager takes project 2, his effort level e  affects the 
success probability .P   Specifically, the project’s success probability is given by 
],1,0[∈= eP γ  where γ  is the manager’s ability parameter.  The manager faces cost 
of effort .2ec β=  
 
We model managerial overconfidence as follows. The manager’s perceived ability is 
.ˆ γγ ≥  Therefore, the manager’s perceived success probability is .ˆˆ eP γ=  If ,ˆ γγ >  the 
manager is overconfident in his ability. If ,ˆ γγ =  the manager is ‘well-calibrated’ (or 
rational).  If the project succeeds, it provides income .R  If it fails, it provides income 
zero.  
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Date 3  (Project Outcome Stage):  If project 1 has been taken, it provides income 
.IR >  If project 2 has been taken, it succeeds, and provides income ,R  with 
probability ,P  and it fails, and provides income zero, with probability .1 P−   
 
Since the firm has free cash flow, with productive ‘growth’ opportunities available, 
our model may be considered as relating to the early stage of the firm’s lifecycle.  
Following Damodaran’s (2001) life-cycle analysis of capital structure, we consider 
the effect of debt on the firm’s ability to invest in the new projects. 
 
We assume that, if the manager has enough free cash flow (after paying debt holders) 
to invest in both projects, he will do so. Further, if the manager only has enough free 
cash flow to invest in one project, he chooses project 1 (the positive NPV project). 
 Depending on managerial ability and effort, project 2 may have positive or negative 
NPV. If project 2 has negative NPV, the manager can use the debt level to commit not 
to take project 2, as follows. If the manager issues debt ,IXD −>  he is unable to 
take either project. If he issues debt ,2IXDIX −>>−  he is able to take project 1, 
but is unable to take project 2. If he issues debt ,2IXD −≤  he is able to take both 
projects. 
 
We proceed to solve for the manager’s optimal date 0 debt level. The manager has an 
exogenously given equity stake ]1,0[∈α  in the firm. We assume that the manager can 
only realise his financial wealth in the long-term (ie, he can sell his equity at date 2). 
At date 0, the market observes the manager’s debt choice and values the firm 
accordingly. The manager obtains all of the positive NPV.  
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Therefore, if the manager issues low debt ,2IXDL −≤   he is able to take both 
projects. Therefore, the manager’s payoff is 
 
,2)ˆ(ˆ 2 IeDXRV DEM −∏+∏+−−++=∏ βα    (9) 
 
where eRV γˆˆ =  represents the manager’s perceived expected valuation of project 2, 
R  represents the expected value of project 1, X  is the current free cash flow, D  is 
the face value of debt, 2eβ  is the manager’s cost of effort, I2  is the required 
investment in the two projects, and E∏  and D∏  are the equity-holders’ and debt-
holders’ respective market valuations.   
 
 
Solving ,0
ˆ =∂
∏∂
e
M  we obtain the manager’s optimal effort level ,
2
ˆ
* β
γα Re =   which is 
increasing in overconfidence. Therefore, .
2
ˆˆ
22
β
γα RV =  Substituting into (9), we obtain 
 
.2)
2
ˆ
)(1(
4
ˆˆ
2222
IRXRRM −++−+=∏ β
γαγαβ
γα     (10) 
 
If the manager chooses ,2IXDIX −>>−  he is only able to take project 1. 
Therefore, his expected payoff beomes 
 
.ˆ IRXM −+=∏        (11) 
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If the manager chooses ,IXD −>  he is unable to take any project, and his expected 
payoff becomes 
 
.)1(ˆ XXXM =−+=∏ αα       (12) 
 
Since ,IR >  (11) > (12). Therefore, the manager will not issue high debt, .IXD −>   
The manager makes his choice between medium debt and low debt by comparing (10) 
and (11). Assume the following; 
 
).
2
)(1(
4
)
2
ˆ
)(1(
4
ˆ 22222222
β
αγαβ
γα
β
γαγαβ
γα RRIRR −+>≥−+       (A.2) 
 
This assumption ensures that, for the overconfident manager, (10) > (11), while, for 
the rational manager, with ,γˆγ =  (11) > (10).  
 
From assumption A.2, we state the following result; 
 
Proposition 2: Managerial overconfidence affects the debt level and firm value in the 
early stage (free cash flow and future growth opportunities) model, as follows; 
 
a) The rational manager chooses the medium debt level IXDIX M 2−>>−  
(to commit not to take project 2). Firm value is .IRXV −+=  
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b) The overconfident manager chooses the low debt level ,2IXD −≤  (in order 
to be able to take both projects). Firm value is .2
2
ˆ 2 IRXRV −++= β
γαγ   
Firm value is higher in the overconfidence case if .
2
ˆ 2 IR >β
γαγ  Firm value is 
lower if .
2
ˆ 2 IR <β
γαγ  
 
Therefore, our second model provides a novel result; increasing managerial 
overconfidence results in lower debt. This result contradicts existing research that 
finds a positive relationship between overconfidence and debt. We discuss this further 
in the next section.  
 
4. Empirical Implications. 
 
In version 1 of our model (managerial shirking), increasing overconfidence results in 
higher debt. The value of the firm may increase or decrease. Much existing empirical 
research provides evidence of a positive relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and debt. There have been few empirical tests on the effects of 
overconfidence on firm value. 
In version 2 of our model (free cash flow), increasing overconfidence results in lower 
debt. This is a novel result, not supported by the existing empirical evidence. 
Following Jensen (1986), we suggest that a negative relationship might exist between 
managerial overconfidence and debt levels in young firms that face many growth 
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opportunities. In older firms with very few growth opportunities, we might expect the 
standard positive relationship between overconfidence and debt2. 
Both versions of our model reveal an ambiguous relationship between overconfidence 
and firm value. There has been little empirical analysis of such a relationship. We 
suggest that future researchers could use the event study methodology to analyse the 
effects of changes in overconfidence on debt levels and firm value/investor returns.   
 
Our model also suggests a novel implication, not previously identified in the research. 
We term the phenomenon, “excess debt sensitivity to the firm’s life-cycle.” Following 
Jensen (1986), Damodaran (2001) suggests that firms should employ a life-cycle 
approach to choosing debt levels. He argues that when firms are young (in the early 
stage of their lifecycle), they should employ low debt levels, in order to provide 
sufficient cash flow to take new projects. When firms are older (at the latter stage of 
the life-cycle), future growth opportunities may be low. Furthermore, moral hazard 
problems in relation to current projects may be high (eg managerial shirking). 
Therefore, Damodaran argues that older firms should have higher debt. In summary, 
the author suggests that debt should begin at a low level, and increase over the life-
cycle of the firm. 
Our models provide an interesting insight. In our first model, the rational manager 
chooses medium debt (low enough to take the positive NPV project, but high enough 
to commit not to take the negative NPV project). The overconfident manager 
overestimates his ability, and sets low debt in order to take both projects. In our 
second model, the firm already has a project in place, and has no future opportunities. 
                                                 
2 A caveat here is that the psychological research demonstrates that overconfidence increases with age 
and experience. Young firms may be run by relatively inexperienced, much more calibrated managers. 
There may be much more overconfidence in older firms with more established and experienced 
managers.  
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The rational manager continues to choose the medium debt level, in order to commit 
to medium effort.  The overconfident manager chooses the high debt level, in order to 
commit to high effort. 
Combining these two models, we obtain a type of life-cycle model. We demonstrate 
that the rational manager chooses medium debt throughout, while the overconfident 
manger chooses low debt in the early stage, and high debt in the late stage. Hence, we 
predict that overconfidence will result in excessive sensitivity of debt to the lifecycle. 
We represent this conceptual analysis in appendix diagram 1.  
 
A further interesting complication is that overconfidence may increase over time and 
experience (and hence over the lifecycle). Therefore, the sensitivity of debt to the 
lifecycle may increase over time. We may test this by regressing debt against a term 
embodying an interaction of firm age with a measure of overconfidence. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
We have developed two moral hazard models in order to consider the effects of 
managerial overconfidence on financing decisions and firm value. Our first model 
considered the specific agency problem of managerial shirking. We demonstrated a 
positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and debt, in line with the 
existing theoretical and empirical research. Our second model analysed an agency 
problem relating to free cash flow. We obtained the novel result that managerial 
overconfidence and debt may be negatively related.   In both cases, the effect of 
overconfidence on firm value was ambiguous. 
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Our model provides a basis for future research. Firstly, our model should be 
developed into a fully-fledged life-cycle model, integrating the two approaches 
(managerial shirking and free cash flow) that we have presented here. Secondly, 
further empirical research is required, analysing the relationship between 
overconfidence and leverage (is it positive or negative?). Thirdly, our analysis opens 
up a new area of theoretical and empirical enquiry into overconfidence and life-cycle 
debt. 
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Appendix:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1: The effect of Managerial Overconfidence on Life-cycle Debt. 
 
We conceptualise that increasing managerial overconfidence may result in an increase 
in debt sensitivity to the firm’s life-cycle (excessively low debt in the early stages, 
and excessively high debt in the later stages of the life cycle). 
 
 
 
 
 
Time 
Debt Managerial 
Overconfidence 
Well-calibrated, 
Rational, Manager 
 © Richard Fairchild 2007 23
 
References: 
 
Barros, L., and Silveira, A., 2007. “Overconfidence, Managerial Optimism, and the 
determinants of Capital Structure.” Mimeo 
 
Damodaran, A.  2001. Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice, Second Edition. 
Wiley International Edition.  
 
 
Fairchild, R, 2003a. “Conflicts between Managers and Investors over the Optimal 
Financial Contract.”  International Journal of Business and Economics: Symposium 
on Principal-agent Models. 
 
Fairchild, R, 2004. “Behavioral Finance in a Principal-agent model of Capital 
Budgeting”. University of Bath School of Management Working Paper Series. 
 
Fairchild, R., 2005a “The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence, Asymmetric 
Information, and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions.”  SSRN. 
 
Fairchild, R., 2005b. “Managerial Overconfidence, Moral Hazard, and Financing and 
Investment Decisions.” University of Bath School of Management Working Paper 
Series. 
 
 
 © Richard Fairchild 2007 24
Gervais, S., J.B. Heaton, and T. Odean, 2003. “Overconfidence, Investment Policy, 
and Executive Stock Options.” SSRN working paper. 
 
Grossman, S, and O. Hart. 1982. “Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial 
Incentives,” in The Economics of Uncertainty, E. Lippman and J. McCall eds., 
Chicago University Press.  
 
Hackbarth, D, 2002. “Managerial Optimism, Overconfidence, and Capital Structure 
Decisions. Mimeo. 
 
Hackbarth, D., 2004a. “Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions.” Mimeo. 
 
Hackbarth, D., 2004b. “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing: A Behavioral 
Perspective.” Mimeo. 
 
Heaton, J.B, 2002. “Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance.” Financial 
Management 33-45. 
 
 
Leland, H. and D. Pyle, 1977. “Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and 
Financial Intermediaries,” Journal of Finance 32, 371-387. 
 
Jensen, M. 1986. “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers.” AEA Papers and Proceedings 323-329. 
 
 © Richard Fairchild 2007 25
Jensen, M, and W. Meckling, 1976. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Capital Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
 
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate, 2005a. “Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate 
Investment? CEO Overconfidence Mesures Revisited.” European Financial 
Management. Vol 11, No 5, 649 - 659. 
 
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate, 2005b. “CEO Overconfidence and Corporate 
Investment.” Journal of Finance 60 (5). 
 
Malmendier, U., G. Tate and J. Yan, 2005c. “Corporate Finance Policies with 
Overconfident Managers.” SSRN Working Paper. 
 
Myers, S.C. and N.S. Majluf, 1984, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions 
When Firms have Information that Investors do not Have.”  Journal of Financial 
Economics 13, 187-221. 
 
Oliver, B (2005). “The Impact of Management Confidence on Capital Structure.” 
Mimeo. 
 
Ross, S.A., 1977. “The Determination of Financial Structure: the Incentive Signalling 
Approach.” The Bell Journal of Economics 8, 23-40. 
 
Shefrin, H. 1999. “Behavioral Corporate Finance.” SSRN Working Paper. 
 
 © Richard Fairchild 2007 26
Statman, M, and D. Caldwell,  1987. “Applying Behavioral Finance to Capital 
Budgeting: Project Terminations.” Financial Management 1987. 
 
Stein, J.C., 1996.  “Rational Capital Budgeting in an Irrational World.” Journal of 
Business 69, 4. 429-455. 
 
Zacharakis, A, and D. Shepherd, 2001. “The Nature of Information and 
Overconfidence on Venture Capitalists’ Decision Making.” Journal of Business 
Venturing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
University of Bath School of Management 
Working Paper Series 
 
School of Management 
Claverton Down 
Bath 
BA2 7AY 
United Kingdom 
Tel: +44 1225 826742 
Fax: +44 1225 826473 
http://www.bath.ac.uk/management/research/papers.htm 
 
2006 
2006.01 Neil Allan and Louise 
Beer 
Strategic Risk: It’s all in your head 
2006.02 Richard Fairchild Does Auditor Retention increase Managerial 
Fraud? - The Effects of Auditor Ability and 
Auditor Empathy. 
2006.03 Richard Fairchild Patents and innovation - the effect of 
monopoly protection, competitive spillovers 
and sympathetic collaboration. 
2006.04 Paul A. Grout and 
Anna Zalewska  
Profitability Measures and Competition Law 
2006.05 Steven McGuire The United States, Japan and the Aerospace 
Industry: technological change in the shaping 
of a political relationship 
2006.06 Richard Fairchild & 
Yiyuan Mai 
The Strength of the Legal System, Empathetic 
Cooperation, and the Optimality of Strong or 
Weak Venture Capital Contracts 
2006.07 Susanna Xin Xu, Joe 
Nandhakumar and 
Christine Harland 
Enacting E-relations with Ancient Chinese 
Military Stratagems 
2006.08 Gastón Fornés and 
Guillermo Cardoza 
Spanish companies in Latin America: a 
winding road  
2006.09 Paul Goodwin, Robert 
Fildes, Michael 
Lawrence and 
Konstantinos 
Nikolopoulos 
The process of using a forecasting support 
system 
  
2006.10 Jing-Lin Duanmu An Integrated Approach to Ownership 
Choices of MNEs in China: A Case Study of 
Wuxi 1978-2004 
2006.11 J.Robert Branston and 
James R. Wilson 
Transmitting Democracy: A Strategic Failure 
Analysis of Broadcasting and the BBC 
2006.12 Louise Knight & 
Annie Pye 
Multiple Meanings of ‘Network’: some 
implications for interorganizational theory and 
research practice 
2006.13 Svenja Tams Self-directed Social Learning: The Role of 
Individual Differences 
2006.14 Svenja Tams Constructing Self-Efficacy at Work: A 
Person-Centered Perspective 
2006.15 Robert Heath, David 
Brandt & Agnes 
Nairn 
Brand relationships: strengthened by emotion, 
weakened by attention 
2006.16 Yoonhee Tina Chang Role of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) and 
Capital Adequacy in Banking Structure and 
Competition 
2006.17 Fotios Pasiouras Estimating the technical and scale efficiency 
of Greek commercial banks: the impact of 
credit risk, off-balance sheet activities, and 
international operations 
2006.18 Eleanor Lohr Establishing the validity and legitimacy of 
love as a living standard of judgment through 
researching the relation of being and doing in 
the inquiry, 'How can love improve my 
practice?’  
2006.19 Fotios Pasiouras, 
Chrysovalantis 
Gaganis & Constantin 
Zopounidis  
Regulations, supervision approaches and 
acquisition likelihood in the Asian banking 
industry  
2006.20 Robert Fildes, Paul 
Goodwin, Michael 
Lawrence & Kostas 
Nikolopoulos 
Producing more efficient demand forecasts 
 
